Celebrating the continued importance of "Machiavellian Intelligence" 30 years on by Hopper, Lydia M et al.
1 
Celebrating the Continued Importance of “Machiavellian Intelligence” Thirty Years On 1 
2 
Lydia M. Hopper1, Erica van de Waal2, & Christine A. Caldwell3 3 
4 
1. Lester E. Fisher Center for the Study and Conservation of Apes, Lincoln Park Zoo, Chicago, IL5 
60622, USA6 
2. Department of Ecology and Evolution, University of Lausanne, 1015 Lausanne, Switzerland7 
3. Division of Psychology, University of Stirling, Stirling, FK9 4LA, UK8 
9 
Corresponding authors: L.M. Hopper (lhopper@lpzoo.org); E. van de Waal (erica.vandewaal@unil.ch); 10 
C.A. Caldwell (c.a.caldwell@stir.ac.uk)11 
12 
©American Psychological Association, 2018. This paper is not the copy of record and may not 
exactly replicate the authoritative document published in the APA journal. Please do not copy 
or cite without author's permission. The final article is available, upon publication, at: 
https://doi.org/10.1037/com0000157
 2 
Abstract 13 
 14 
The question of what has shaped primates’ (and other species’) cognitive capacities, whether technical 15 
or social demands remains a hot topic of inquiry. Indeed, a key area of study within the field of 16 
comparative psychology in the last few decades has been the focus on social life as a driving force 17 
behind the evolution of cognition, studied from behavioral and neurological perspectives, and from 18 
theoretical and empirical perspectives. Reflecting on contemporary studies of primate social cognition 19 
specifically one cannot ignore the book, Machiavellian Intelligence, co-edited by Richard Byrne and 20 
Andrew Whiten (Byrne & Whiten, 1988a). It is a keystone for the field: the volume as a whole has been 21 
cited over 3,000 times, without even including citations to individual chapters. This year, 2018, is the 22 
30th anniversary of the first publication of Machiavellian Intelligence, and with this special issue of the 23 
Journal of Comparative Psychology we mark that milestone. The key concept put forth in Machiavellian 24 
Intelligence was that primates’ socio-cognitive abilities were shaped by the complex social worlds that 25 
they inhabited, rather than the technical or foraging challenges that they faced, as had previously been 26 
posited. In this issue, we consider the strength of the Machiavellian intelligence hypothesis 30 years on 27 
to explain primate social cognition, and we consider its applicability to non-primate species and to other 28 
cognitive domains. 29 
 30 
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Introduction 34 
“The idea of social intelligence is one whose time has come, but such ideas have been struggling to the 35 
surface for some time, in interestingly different forms” (Whiten & Byrne, 1988a, p.1) 36 
 37 
From reading Humphrey’s (1976) essay, The Social Function of Intellect, Whiten and Byrne (1988a) 38 
identified three hypotheses regarding the interplay between social complexity and intelligence (Whiten, 39 
this issue). These were that species, such as primates, that live in complex social systems have evolved 40 
cognitive adaptations to negotiate their social environment; that social complexity selects for greater 41 
general intelligence; and that social complexity selects for more sophisticated social cognition 42 
specifically. And so were born the nascent ideas that ultimately formed the Machiavellian intelligence 43 
hypothesis (MIH). Importantly, MIH directed focus on primates’ cognitive skills in the social realm, 44 
rather than in the technical realm and, more specifically, how the challenges that socially-living primates 45 
face have shaped their intelligence. To create a cohesive discussion around this topic, which had been 46 
contemplated contemporaneously by a number of scholars, including Humphrey (1976), Jolly (1966), 47 
and Kummer and Goodall (1985), and often using different terminology, Byrne and Whiten (1998a) 48 
published the edited volume Machiavellian Intelligence. 49 
 50 
With Machiavellian Intelligence, Byrne and Whiten (1998a) brought together a collection of chapters, 51 
some which represented previously-published works (e.g., Humphrey, 1988; Jolly, 1988; Cheney & 52 
Seyfarth, 1988) and some that were novel contributions (e.g., Harcourt, 1988; Premack, 1988; Wynn, 53 
1988). The chapters in Machiavellian Intelligence discussed topics related to social behavior and 54 
collective action (Chance & Mead, 1988; Menzel, 1988), primates’ understanding of social relationships 55 
(Dasser, 1988; Seyfarth & Cheney, 1988), and how primates use that understanding to manipulate the 56 
actions of others for their own benefit (so-called tactical deception, Byrne & Whiten, 1988b; Whiten & 57 
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Byrne 1988b) and to form alliances (e.g., de Waal, 1988; Kummer, 1988). The book also contained 58 
contributions from authors who considered these topics in relation to human behavior (LaFrenière, 59 
1988; Smith, 1988), thus providing a comparative perspective with our own species.  60 
 61 
In the 30 years since the publication of Machiavellian Intelligence it has been well established that 62 
conspecifics influence the daily decision making of individual primates, and these interactions may be 63 
mediated further by the primates’ relative rank (e.g., Kendal et al., 2015; Lee & Cowlishaw, 2017), age, 64 
(e.g., Biro et al., 2003) or sex (e.g., Lonsdorf et al., 2004; van de Waal et al., 2010), to name a few 65 
factors. More specifically, much work has investigated primates’, and other species’, cognitive abilities in 66 
the social domain (e.g., de Waal & Ferrari, 2012; Seyfarth & Cheney, 2017), as well as what mechanisms 67 
might be homologous to those of humans (e.g., Banaji & Gelman, 2013; Tremblay et al., 2017). However, 68 
there has been remarkably limited investigation formally testing the hypotheses laid out by Whiten and 69 
Byrne (1988a). In particular, little work has tested the relationship between species’ cognitive skills 70 
specific to the social domain, with the complexity of their social structure or the average group size in 71 
which they live. In spite of this, the theories discussed by Byrne and Whiten (1988a) continue be to cited 72 
in contemporary empirical and theoretical work regarding a variety of species (e.g., Bshary, 2011; 73 
Plotnik & Clayton, 2015; Farris, 2016; Hall & Brosnan, 2016; Reichert & Quinn, 2017; Bereczkei, 2018), 74 
even inspiring book titles such as Macachiavellian Intelligence (Maestripieri, 2007). In recognition of the 75 
importance of Machiavellian Intelligence, and to highlight what advances have been made in the last 30 76 
years in testing the MIH, in this special issue we include invited essays by both Byrne (this issue) and 77 
Whiten (this issue). In their essays Byrne and Whiten outline the foundations of the MIH while reflecting 78 
on contemporary considerations of primate social intelligence. In addition to Byrne and Whiten’s 79 
retrospective essays, we also showcase two empirical studies (Schweinfurth et al., this issue; Borgeaud 80 
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& Bshary, this issue) and a review by Lucas et al. (this issue) that considers how animals’ communicative 81 
abilities might interface with the MIH.  82 
 83 
In their review, Lucas et al. (this issue) stretch the previous focus of Machiavellian Intelligence on 84 
behavioral interactions to communicative interactions. They consider the interplay between social 85 
complexity and communicative complexity, providing examples from an array of species to support their 86 
arguments, beyond the primate-centered focus of Machiavellian Intelligence (Byrne & Whiten, 1988a). 87 
In the way that social complexity has been proposed to generate cognitive complexity (i.e. MIH), Lucas 88 
and colleagues outline how social complexity is also associated with more complex vocal 89 
communication. Lucas et al. also highlight how communicative strategies exemplify both the 90 
competitive and cooperative aspects of Machiavellian intelligence. They cite, for example, reports of 91 
low-ranking wild capuchins (Cebus apella nigritus) who deceptively use alarm calls to disperse group 92 
mates and gain access to food resources (Wheeler, 2010; Wheeler & Hammerschmidt, 2012; Kean et al. 93 
2017) and, conversely, how chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) produce rough grunt vocalizations to inform 94 
group mates about the presence and availability of food (Slocombe & Zuberbühler, 2006; Schel et al., 95 
2013). 96 
 97 
In their empirical study, Borgeaud and Bshary (this issue) used an elegant approach to test social 98 
cognition in primates. Borgeaud and Bshary trained wild vervet monkeys (Chlorocebus pygerythrus), 99 
living at the Inkawu Vervet Project, South Africa, to obtain food from personalized boxes, which the 100 
researchers opened by remote control when specific monkeys approached. They attracted pairs of adult 101 
females to the experimental setup, with their two personal boxes placed in close proximity to one 102 
another, thus potentially creating conflict over the monopolizable food resources. The authors used this 103 
set up to investigate if monkeys anticipate partners’ reciprocity decision rules. Specifically, they 104 
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presented the boxes to dyads of monkeys for which the subordinate monkey had recently been seen to 105 
groom the more-dominant individual or for which no such grooming interaction had occurred. The 106 
questions Borgeaud and Bshary addressed included whether subordinates were less likely to approach 107 
their box when dominants were already present, how this was mediated by their previous grooming 108 
interactions, and how the two monkeys’ interactions at the box were influenced by audience effects (i.e. 109 
which other group members were in the vicinity of the boxes). Their results showed some effects of 110 
audience composition on the monkeys’ decisions to approach their boxes, however they did not find any 111 
evidence that monkeys took in account their previous grooming-partner in their decisions.  112 
 113 
Cooperation and competition are now well recognized as potential aspects of Machiavellian intelligence. 114 
However, in their contribution to this volume, Schweinfurth et al. (this issue) focus on a potentially 115 
neglected facet of social intelligence, which is the ability to engage in coercion. They report observations 116 
of “social tool” use by chimpanzees at the Chimfunshi Wildlife Orphanage in Zambia. The chimpanzees 117 
were presented with a novel drinking fountain that required the chimpanzees to press buttons to 118 
release juice from the fountain. However, the fountain was located 3m away from the buttons and so 119 
individuals could not simultaneously operate the mechanism and benefit from the juice produced. The 120 
authors report multiple instances in which a 24-year-old male chimpanzee, Bobby, coerced two young 121 
chimpanzees, Kenny (aged six) and Jewel (aged four), to press the buttons while he drank the juice. By 122 
recruiting the two juveniles, and using them as social tools, Bobby was able to increase the rate at which 123 
he drank juice. Schweinfurth et al. liken this behavior to that of previous reports of Japanese macaque 124 
(Macaca fuscata, Tokida et al., 1994) and orangutan (Pongo pygmaeus, Völter et al. 2015) mothers 125 
recruiting their infants to obtain out-of-reach food before taking it from the infants to eat themselves. 126 
Thus, the use of social tools by primates (and other species - Schweinfurth et al. also provide examples 127 
from birds) speaks to the “exploitative dimensions” of Machiavellian Intelligence.  128 
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 129 
A common misconception about the MIH is that it only pertains to primates’ skill at competitive or 130 
agonistic interactions, likely as a consequence of the impact of Byrne and Whiten’s early work on tactical 131 
deception among baboons (Whiten & Byrne, 1988b), as well as the adoption of the term 132 
“machiavelliansim” in modern psychology to refer to a manipulative personality trait (Sloan Wilson et 133 
al., 1996). Indeed, Byrne and Whiten, in reference to their observations of baboons, asserted that 134 
deception was “a particularly sensitive yardstick for the depth of Machiavellian intelligence a species can 135 
display” (Byrne & Whiten, 1988b, p.205). However, as both Byrne (this issue) and Whiten (this issue) 136 
point out, the MIH refers to both cooperative as well as competitive aspects of social cognition, as 137 
highlighted by the articles included in this special issue. Theoretical modelling has also demonstrated 138 
how the competitive challenges that group living creates, can also generate cooperative capacities 139 
(Orbell et al. 2004). Indeed, from their recent study of group-movement decision making in wild 140 
baboons (Papio anubis), Strandburg-Peshkin et al. (2015) concluded “democratic collective action 141 
emerging from simple rules is widespread, even in complex, socially stratified societies” (p. 1358). Due in 142 
part to the misinterpretation of the term Machiavellian intelligence, or its limited pertinence to certain 143 
(non-primate) species, some researchers have adopted the term ‘social intelligence hypothesis’ or 144 
‘social brain hypothesis’ (Barton & Dunbar, 1997; Dunbar, 1998) in favor of MIH. However, the social 145 
intelligence hypothesis is often used to describe the relationship between social complexity and domain-146 
general cognitive abilities, which is just one of the three potential relationships between social lives and 147 
cognition which are encompassed under the umbrella of the MIH (Whiten, this issue). 148 
 149 
However, it is almost certainly this particular aspect of the MIH that has most captured the imagination 150 
of the scientific community. There has been a heavy emphasis on work investigating domain-general 151 
cognitive ability and its relationship with the skills required to navigate social living. Commonly, in an 152 
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attempt to discern relationships between social complexity and cognitive skill, researchers have 153 
investigated the correlation between a species’ relative brain size, or their encephalization quotient, and 154 
the size of the social groups in which they typically live (reviewed in Reader & Laland, 2002; Byrne, this 155 
issue), as well as neocortex ratio and a species’ network efficiency (important when considering 156 
information transmission among group members for example, Pasquaretta et al., 2014). Such research 157 
offers an opportunity for a nuanced perspective, important because, as Barton and Dunbar (1997) noted 158 
“group size may be confounded with other ecological variables, such as diet, home range size and 159 
activity timing, so it is also important to make sure that none of these is the ‘real’ correlate of neocortex 160 
size” (p. 247, see also Reader & Laland, 2002). In his essay, Byrne (this issue) provides an overview of 161 
this line of investigation while also highlighting recent work that has challenged previously-published 162 
findings that brain size and encephalization quotient are positively correlated with group size. 163 
Specifically, last year DeCasien et al. (2017) reported that diet was a better predictor of primates’ 164 
encephalization quotient than was sociality, while Powell et al. (2017) questioned the relationship 165 
between primates’ brain size and group size, instead finding a relationship between brain size and home 166 
range size, diet, and activity. Furthermore, Fedorova et al. (2017) compared the relative brain size of 61 167 
woodpecker (Picidae) species and found that group-living species had smaller relative brain sizes 168 
compared to those that were solitary. There are, of course, limitations to this approach, not least the 169 
limited picture that can be gained from substituting brain size for cognition, as noted by Barrett (2018). 170 
Addressing this, both Byrne (this issue) and Whiten (this issue) showcase a study, published earlier this 171 
year by Ashton et al. (2018), that empirically tested the role between cognitive skill (problem solving) 172 
and group size with Australian magpies (Cracticus tibicen dorsalis). In their intra-species study, Ashton 173 
and colleagues reported that the birds’ ability when presented with a battery of cognitive tasks was 174 
related to the group size in which they lived, providing support for the social intelligence hypothesis. 175 
This recent study paves the way for a new generation of empirical investigations of not only the mental 176 
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hardware supporting Machiavellian intelligence, but also the mechanistic outcomes that have promoted 177 
primates socio-cognitive expertise.  178 
 179 
Conclusion 180 
Investigations of primates’, and other species’, socio-cognitive abilities have ammassed since the 181 
publication of Machiavellian Intelligence (Byrne & Whiten, 1988a), providing many novel insights into 182 
animals’ social intelligence. However, evaluations of the mechanisms driving these skills are still lacking. 183 
As we reflect on the impact of Byrne and Whiten’s seminal volume, it is clear that it has had a profound 184 
impact on how we consider animals socio-cognitive abilities, even changing the vernacular we use to 185 
describe it. Highlighting the importance and impact of Byrne and Whiten’s MIH, their work has spawned 186 
empiricial research in both the lab and field, addressing topics discussed in Machiavellian Intelligence, 187 
including deception, theory of mind, and alliance formation cooperation, as well as other areas of social 188 
cognition, such as inequity aversion, communication, and the nuances of social learning mechanisms 189 
and strategies. While contemporary research continues to challenge our notions of what the key drivers 190 
for social intelligence might be, our interest in this topic shows no signs of abating.  191 
 192 
It has been our great pleasure to edit this volume, celebrating this seminal scientific work. All three of 193 
our research careers have been directly influenced by the work of Whiten and Byrne, including the ideas 194 
put forth in Machiavellian Intelligence. We have each studied aspects of primate social cognition, and 195 
have taken a comparative approach in doing so, studying multiple species including humans. We are 196 
proud to present the novel contributions it contains, which extend and relfect upon the central themes 197 
of Machiavellian Intelligence.   198 
 199 
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